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Abstract
We present an interactive eye-tracking study that explores the strategic use of gaze. 
We analyze gaze behavior in an experiment with four simple games. The game can 
either be a competitive (hide & seek) game in which players want to be unpredict-
able, or a game of common interest in which players want to be predictable. Gaze is 
transmitted either in real time to another subject, or it is not transmitted and there-
fore non-strategic. We find that subjects are able to interpret non-strategic gaze, 
obtaining substantially higher payoffs than subjects who do not see gaze. If gaze 
is transmitted in real time, gaze becomes more informative in the common interest 
games and players predominantly succeed to coordinate on efficient outcomes. In 
contrast, gaze becomes less informative in the competitive game.
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1 Introduction
In 1960, Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling described a hypothetical experimental 
setting to test his theories as follows: “The first stage in the experiment is to invent 
a machine, perhaps on the principle of the lie detector, that will record or meas-
ure a person’s recognition or the focus of his attention […]” (Schelling 1960: 109). 
Since then, eye-tracking has developed into an affordable and precise method that 
is increasingly used in industry and research (Duchowski 2007; Holmqvist et  al. 
2011). Recently, it has attracted the attention of firms that develop technology for 
the twenty-first century such as eye controls for mobile devices, computer games, or 
smart homes.1 In research, eye-tracking has become a popular tool for the analysis 
of decision-making processes. In particular, it has been proven to be useful when 
studying how people play games and to infer players’ levels of sophistication from 
recorded gaze data (Knoepfle et  al. 2009; Wang et  al. 2010; Stewart et  al. 2016; 
Polonio et al. 2015).2 In contrast to this literature, we extend the use of eye-tracking 
technology to be part of the strategic interaction.
For this purpose, we use eye trackers connected to the software z-tree (Fisch-
bacher 2007) such that players can see a real-time representation of the other play-
er’s gaze before making a choice. This setting is very close to what Schelling envi-
sioned, and it opens up new possibilities for studying strategic interactions with 
gaze. If Schelling’s prediction that each player “knows that his own visible reaction 
is yielding information about his own expectations” (Schelling 1960: 110) is true, 
then gaze that is transmitted to the other player should differ in predictable ways 
from gaze that is not transmitted. The aim of our study is to analyze how gaze and 
the interpretation of gaze change with the strategic environment.
Since eyes are a very natural means of communication, observing a person’s gaze 
could help to coordinate if people share a common interest. There is ample evidence 
that individuals can learn from observing gaze in collaborative problem-solving 
tasks.3 At the same time, the beneficial effects of gaze transfer are limited: Gaze 
cannot transmit complex information, and its dual use for visual search and for indi-
cating a location creates ambiguities in the meaning of transmitted gaze.4
1 For example, Oculus bought The EyeTribe in 2016, Google bought Eyefluence in 2016, Apple bought 
SMI in 2017. Already, Eyeware raised 1.9 mio CHF and aims to develop technology that allows to use 
gaze to control gadgets in the apartment.
2 Other studies use mouse-tracking for similar purposes (Costa‐Gomes et al. 2001; Brocas et al. 2014). 
In comparison to mouse-tracking, eye-tracking is thought to be less intrusive in the decision making 
process as quick comparisons and information search are less affected by the recording mechanism (see 
Glöckner and Herbold (2011) and the literature cited therein).
3 See for example, Velichkovsky (1995), Stein and Brennan (2004), Litchfield et al. (2010), Litchfield 
and Ball (2011), Brennan et al. (2008), Neider et al. (2010). It has further been shown that people are 
generally better at interpreting dynamic rather than static representations of gaze in various types of tasks 
(Nalanagula et  al. 2006; Gallagher-Mitchell et  al. 2018; van Wermeskerken et  al. 2018). While these 
studies analyze how the benefits of gaze transfer depend on the nature of the task environment, they do 
not consider the effects of varying incentives.
4 See e.g. Müller et al. (2013); Müller et al. (2014). The limits of eye-to-eye communication are nicely 
expressed in the science fiction novel “The Dark Forest”, in which two of the characters try to convey 
a message through facial expressions: “They stared at each other, but held that pose for less than half a 
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Observing gaze might not be helpful at all, if players have an incentive to be 
unpredictable or even to deceive another player. The question is how difficult people 
find it to keep their gaze from revealing their intentions in such situations. It could 
be that “eyes don’t lie” and that gaze always conveys information even if this is not 
in the players’ interest.5 For sender-receiver games without gaze transmission, Wang 
et al. (2010) show that there is substantial information about the intentions contained 
in eye movements and pupil dilation of the senders, potentially helping receivers to 
obtain a larger payoff at the expense of senders. In a recent study that compares non-
strategic gaze with deceptive gaze (Foulsham and Lock 2015), subjects are a lot less 
successful in guessing the choice made by a previously eye-tracked subject when the 
eye-tracked subjects are instructed to hide their true preferences. Success rates in 
the deceptive treatment are lower than in a baseline without any gaze transfer, but—
although guessers are not aware of the instructions—not lower than chance. In other 
contexts, the sincerity of eye movements is an illusion that might be exploited by 
liars. For example, many people, even professional interrogators, mistakenly believe 
that deception is associated with evasive eye movements (Vrij 2004).
To systematically test how people adapt their gaze when their focus of attention 
is shown to another player on screen, i.e. strategic gaze, we let subjects play four 
simple two-player games. We use three common interest games, in which being pre-
dictable is in the interest of the eye-tracked player, and a competitive hide & seek 
game, in which being predictable can be exploited by the other player. In order to 
investigate differences between strategic and non-strategic gaze, we use a treatment 
in which gaze is recorded but not transmitted to the other player as a benchmark. 
This non-strategic gaze is later shown to participants in another treatment who then 
play against the respective gaze and choices. With this design, we test the limits of 
the ability to infer choices from gaze along two dimensions, varying the incentive to 
affect gaze (recorded gaze vs. live gaze transmission) and as well as the nature of the 
strategic interaction between the games (common interest vs. competitive).
We find strong evidence that people are able to correctly interpret non-strategic 
gaze patterns, both in the common interest games and also, but somewhat less suc-
cessfully, in the hide & seek game. When gaze is transmitted live to the other player, 
subjects can dramatically increase their success rates in the common interest games 
compared to the situation in which they do not see gaze. In the hide & seek game, 
the seekers’ success rate is the same as when they do not see gaze. Although aggre-
gate success rates are consistent with gaze being completely uninformative, an anal-
ysis of individual gazing strategies suggests that there is heterogeneity in the chosen 
strategies. In the hide & seek game, we identify two general types of strategic gaze: 
5 People’s gaze may involuntary reflect the decision-making process or be drawn to salient features. 
After all, professional poker players often wear sunglasses, eye movements of amateur blackjack players 
can reflect the numerical value of their hands (Holmes et al. 2016), and it is very difficult to prevent rec-
ognition of previously seen faces from being shown in the eyes (Schwedes and Wentura 2012).
minute before they burst out laughing at practically the same instant. ‘My message was, `Tonight I’d like 
to invite you to have supper on the Champs-Elysees,’’ he said. She doubled over with laughter. ‘Mine 
was, `You … need to shave!’’” (Liu 2008, p. 179).
Footnote 4 (continued)
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Most people try to mask their intended choice with an uninformative gaze pattern 
while some try to actively mislead their counterparts into holding a wrong belief. 
Some strategies to actively mislead the other player are more successful: In our data, 
hiders tend to be more successful when they do not choose the option they empha-
size with their gaze.
Our results are a first step to explore how much communication, voluntary or 
involuntary, is possible with gaze. Gaining a better understanding of the strategic 
use of eye-movements is relevant for many economic interactions that take place in 
face-to-face meetings, but also more generally in all situations in which information 
search patterns can be observed. For instance, our results imply that software design 
(e.g. privacy settings) has to take into account that behavior changes if information 
search patterns are observed by others. Similarly, researchers should be aware that 
eye movements, and potentially also other biometrical measures, might be strategi-
cally altered depending on the context.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the exper-
imental design and the hypotheses. The results are presented in Sect. 3, where we 
first focus on non-strategic gaze and then analyze whether and for which games gaze 
and success rates change when gaze is transmitted live instead of recorded. Finally, 
focusing on the hide & seek game, we explore the success of different strategies and 
the heterogeneity of first mover behavior.
2  Methods
2.1  Games
All participants play four different two-player games: A coordination, a focal coor-
dination, a focal discoordination, and a hide & seek game. Each game is played for 
five consecutive rounds with random re-matching of participants and no feedback 
between rounds. The order of games is counterbalanced within each session. In all 
20 rounds, both players see four large, gray squares arranged in a square on their 
computer screens and have to pick one of them. Subjects make their choices by 
pressing one of four keys marked with stickers (R, U, C, and N, approximately mir-
roring the positioning of the boxes on the screen).
Participants’ earnings are determined by whether or not the two players’ actions 
match: In the coordination and the focal coordination game, both participants only 
earn points if they choose the same box. In the focal discoordination game, both par-
ticipants only earn points if their actions do not match. In the hide & seek game, the 
first mover earns points if the actions do not match whereas the second mover earns 
points if the actions do match.
The maximum number of points a player can earn by choosing a box is always 
displayed in the center of a box. In the coordination game and hide & seek game, 
this number is always 10 in all four boxes (Fig. 1, left panel). In the focal coordina-
tion and focal discoordination game, only the top left box gives 10 points whereas 
the other three boxes give 11 points. Figure 1 (right panel) shows the decision screen 
for these games.
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The rules of the games are made common knowledge to the participants (see 
Online Appendix for a translation of the instructions  and all data files). Figure  2 
summarizes the four games in normal form, which however seems less natural than 
the verbal description of the game and was therefore not part of the explanation of 
the games to the participants.
In all games, all possible individual choices are consistent with some Nash equi-
librium. The coordination games have the very intuitive best response to choose the 
same strategy as the other player. There are four Nash equilibria in pure strategies 
in the coordination game, but strategies are isomorphic with no reason to choose 
one over the others except possibly the labeling of the strategies, which here cor-
responds to the boxes’ locations. There is also a completely mixed equilibrium, in 
which every box is chosen with equal probability.
Fig. 1  Decision screen. The left panel shows a screenshot of a subject currently looking at the top left 
box, in either the coordination or the hide and seek game. The right panel shows the decision screen for 
the focal coordination and discoordination game without any box being looked at. For ease of readibility, 
we increased the font size of the numbers
 TL TR BL BR   TL TR BL BR  
TL 10,10 0,0 0,0 0,0  TL 10,10 0,0 0,0 0,0  
TR 0,0 10,10 0,0 0,0  TR 0,0 11,11 0,0 0,0  
BL 0,0 0,0 10,10 0,0  BL 0,0 0,0 11,11 0,0  
BR 0,0 0,0 0,0 10,10  BR 0,0 0,0 0,0 11,11  
 (a) Coordination Game   (b) Focal Coordination Game  
TL TR BL BR TL TR BL BR 
TL 0,0 10,11 10,11 10,11  TL 0,10 10,0 10,0 10,0  
TR 11,10 0,0 11,11 11,11  TR 10,0 0,10 10,0 10,0  
BL 11,10 11,11 0,0 11,11  BL 10,0 10,0 0,10 10,0  
BR 11,10 11,11 11,11 0,0  BR 10,0 10,0 10,0 0,10  
 (c) Focal Discoordination Game   (d) Hide & Seek Game  
Fig. 2  The four games in normal form. Notes: The decision screens of the participants do not show the 
normal form, but a graphical representation of their possible choices (see Fig. 1). The strategies’ labels 
TL, TR, BL, and BR in the normal form correspond to the top left, top right, bottom left, and bottom 
right box on the participants’ computer screens, respectively
 J. Hausfeld et al.
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Similar arguments apply to the focal coordination game, but here the strategies 
are not entirely isomorphic, since coordination on TL yields a slightly lower pay-
off. Thus, the completely mixed Nash equilibrium involves playing TL with slightly 
larger probability. Although the focal discoordination game is also symmetric, the 
only symmetric equilibrium involves completely mixed strategies which put slightly 
less probability on the less efficient focal option TL. Finally, the hide & seek game is 
an asymmetric game which has a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies with 
both players choosing all strategies with equal probability.
2.2  Treatments
We use four between-sessions treatments to explore the role of gaze: NoGaze, 
RecordedGaze, LiveGaze-FreeChoice, and LiveGaze-ForcedChoice. In NoGaze, the 
gaze of the first mover is recorded but not shown to the second mover. With this 
benchmark treatment, we can investigate the informativeness of non-strategic gaze. 
In RecordedGaze, this earlier recorded non-strategic gaze data is displayed to sub-
jects who then also play against the corresponding old decisions. This allows us to 
infer how well subjects understand non-strategic gaze.
In the two remaining treatments, the first mover’s gaze is transmitted in real time 
to the second mover, which allows studying the communicative function of gaze. In 
LiveGaze-FreeChoice, the first mover is able to freely choose any of the four boxes. 
To disentangle the effect of choices and gaze on achieved payoffs, we introduce the 
LiveGaze-ForcedChoice treatment. Here, first movers only earn points if the chosen 
box coincides with the one that has been randomly selected by the computer before-
hand. This box is marked by an arrow that is only visible to the first player (and 
not to the other player) for two seconds before each round. In the LiveGaze-Forced-
Choice treatment, subjects do not have to think about strategic choices and can focus 
on the strategic use of gaze, and saliency no longer serves as a coordination device.
2.3  Procedures
We visualize gaze by changing the color of the square that is currently looked at by 
the first mover from gray to red (see Fig. 1, left panel). This is the case on both the 
screen of the first mover and on the screen of the second mover, i.e. the first mover is 
fully aware of how his gaze data is displayed to the second mover. Although no gaze 
data is transmitted between players in NoGaze, we nevertheless keep the treatments 
as symmetric as possible: For the first movers, the boxes still change color according 
to where they look as in the LiveGaze treatments. Likewise, a second mover also has 
to wait for the first mover to enter his decision before she can enter hers—she merely 
does not see any gaze data.
Participants enter their decisions sequentially without observing the other play-
er’s choice. The eye-tracked player chooses first. Once the first mover enters his 
decision, a green frame appears around the second mover’s screen indicating to her 
that she can now enter her decision. Before each round, subjects see a brief reminder 
of the payoff consequences of matching and non-matching choices for both players 
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for eight seconds, followed by a two-second display announcing the start of the next 
round, and finally a fixation cross in the center of the screen for one second.
To account for our method of gaze visualization in the analysis, we deviate 
from common fixation definitions which typically require that the position of gaze 
remains constant for some minimum amount of time (see Salvucci and Goldberg 
(2000)). Instead, we consider everything a fixation that is actually displayed to the 
participants. A fixation thus starts the moment the respective box turns red and lasts 
until the box turns gray again.
We used Tobii EyeX6 eye trackers with a sampling rate of 60  Hz. Subjects 
sat approximately 58  cm in front of their screens, all of which were of the same 
model and had a resolution of 1280 × 1024 pixels. To improve data quality, we 
used chin rests for all eye-tracked subjects. None of the subjects had issues with the 
eye-trackers.
We ran three sessions in each treatment with eye-tracking (NoGaze, LiveGaze-
FreeChoice, and LiveGaze-ForcedChoice), each with 24 subjects of which the 
twelve first movers were eye-tracked. Data acquisition for the RecordedGaze treat-
ment was finished within one session with 30 second movers who played against the 
recorded gaze and choices of first movers from the NoGaze treatment. Recall that 
subjects were randomly rematched after each round such that each second mover 
faced a unique sequence of first movers. Thus, each second mover in RecordedGaze 
faced one of the exact sequences of first movers that was previously faced by a sec-
ond mover in the NoGaze treatment. The sequences were chosen at random without 
replacement.
The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) and our subjects 
were recruited from the general student population of the University of Konstanz 
using the software ORSEE (Greiner 2015). Each session lasted around 1 h, and sub-
jects were paid €0.1 for each point they earned in the experiment such that they 
received an average of around €17. Our participants had an average age of about 
21 years and about 40% were male.
6 Gibaldi et al. (2017) extensively test the Tobii EyeX and find that this eye tracker is suitable for some 
research but not for tasks which need a higher sampling rate. They find the accuracy is between 0.5 and 
1° while the precision is at 0.25°. Tobii states that no precision above 1.5° will pass a calibration routine. 
Given our distance from the screen, the font size and the size of the rectangles (500 × 400 pixels), we 
should detect all gazes on the number. Further, each box is 70 pixels in the horizontal and 56 pixels in 
vertical dimension apart from the end and middle of the screen. Therefore, the distance between boxes is 
140 pixels (4.7°) in horizontal and 112 (4.1°) in vertical dimension, which should be sufficient to rule out 
that the wrong box changes the color. Note that it is not necessarily important for us that subjects look 
at the number (they were mostly the same), but we wanted every subject to have a reasonable calibration 
quality and that all subjects participate. For these reasons the Tobii EyeX presents an appropriate appa-
ratus. All subjects see which field is highlighted and could adjust if necessary. Eye-blinks or closing the 
eyes, lead to no change in the status quo of the displayed gaze, i.e. if a person looks at the TL box and 
closes her eyes, the TL box is still red.
 J. Hausfeld et al.
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2.4  Hypotheses
With this design, we aim at answering the following questions: First, how informa-
tive is gaze about choices and to what extent are subjects able to exploit this infor-
mation? Second, how do the answers to these questions depend on the strategic 
situation? Several studies have shown that decisions often follow gaze, in the sense 
that the chosen option is both the one that was looked at last and for a longer time 
(see, e.g. the gaze cascade effect as described by Shimojo et al. (2003), or the atten-
tional drift diffusion model by Krajbich et al. (2010)). Gaze should therefore con-
tain some information about strategy choice in a game. Hypothesis 1 (“Interpreting 
gaze”) states that it is possible to infer strategy choices from the observed gaze of 
the choosing subject.
Following the literature mentioned above, we will use mainly two pieces of infor-
mation in order to interpret gaze: Which box first movers looked at for the long-
est time or last. If Hypothesis 1 is true, then these criteria (Most Looked and Last 
Looked) should already reliably predict choice in the RecordedGaze treatment. How 
well people are able to interpret gaze is measured by the second mover’s success rate 
in RecordedGaze compared to NoGaze.
Our second hypothesis is concerned with how the eye-tracked players react to 
gaze being observed by the second mover. It is based on the assumption that gaze 
can be used as a communication device to announce a strategy choice, e.g. by focus-
ing on one option for a long time. Hence, Hypothesis 2 (“Strategic gazing”) states 
that subjects are aware that their gaze conveys information and are able to strategi-
cally adapt it.
If people are able to infer meaning from another person’s gaze, then our set-
up essentially adds a prior communication stage to the game. Communication via 
gaze is cheap talk in the sense that it does not directly affect payoff. Nevertheless, if 
being predictable is in a player’s self-interest, then she should try to communicate 
her intentions as clearly as possible. In the common interest games, communicat-
ing one’s intended choice is “self-signaling” and “self-committing”: A player wants 
the other to think that she will choose a strategy if and only if she indeed intends 
to choose it, and if a player has persuaded the other player that she will play a cer-
tain strategy, she indeed wants to choose that strategy (see, e.g. Farrell and Rabin 
(1996)).
If instead the players have opposed interests, as in the hide & seek game, then 
only the “babbling” equilibrium, in which all messages are ignored, exists. In this 
game, all communication must be completely uninformative in equilibrium. Hence, 
if Hypothesis 2 is true, second movers’ success rates should be higher in the com-
mon interest games for the LiveTreatments than for the NoGaze and RecordedGaze 
treatment. In contrast, the second mover’s success rate in the hide & seek game 
should be highest in RecordedGaze, while it should be close to chance in LiveTreat-
ments and in NoGaze.
The two different LiveGaze treatments allow to distinguish whether observed suc-
cess rates are due to players being attracted to salient choices, or due to information 
content of gaze alone. Hence, if in any game the second movers’ baseline (NoGaze) 
success rates are a lot higher (or lower) than chance, then we may expect success 
1 3
Strategic gaze: an interactive eye-tracking study 
rates to be higher (lower) in LiveGaze-FreeChoice than in LiveGaze-ForcedChoice. 
This may matter in particular if it should turn out that baseline success rates are 
already so large that they are difficult to improve upon.
In the games with a focal option, the LiveGaze-FreeChoice treatment is expected 
to have an impact on choices when there is an inferior focal option. The top left 
box may attract gaze because it stands out with a lower number of points but also 
because the western reading style is used to starting in the top left corner of a text 
(Abed 1991). The top left box can be chosen in equilibrium when communication is 
impossible, but not anymore once intended choice can be signaled with gaze.7
The common interest games differ in their complexity and thus may shed some 
light on the limits of signaling one’s intentions through gaze. A focal option that 
players want to avoid may distract gaze, although it is believed that focal points are 
no longer important once communication is possible (Farrell and Rabin 1996). In 
the discoordination game, it becomes relevant that gaze is not a rich natural lan-
guage (in the sense of Farrell (1993)), since not all messages can be unambiguously 
conveyed with gaze. In contrast to the coordination games, it matters now whether 
focusing on e.g. the top right box is understood as “I will choose the top right box” 
or “You should choose the top right box”.8
These arguments lead to the following order of the signal quality between games 
and treatments: The chosen option should be clearly communicated with gaze (bet-
ter than in RecordedGaze) in the common interest games, with the pure coordination 
game being the easiest, then the focal coordination, and finally the focal discoordi-
nation game. Gaze in the hide & seek game should on average reveal close to noth-
ing about intended choices.
Our predictions are targeted at aggregate statistics. However, since we observe 
initial behavior without feedback between rounds, gazing strategies may differ from 
equilibrium and across subjects. We exploratively investigate two different gazing 
strategies: Hiding all information from one’s gaze (signal-jamming) and trying to 
actively mislead the opponent into holding a wrong belief. Individual gazing strate-
gies are addressed in more detail at the end of Sect. 2.
3  Results
3.1  Aggregate choices
To get a first impression of the effect of transmitting gaze, we start the analysis with 
a brief description of the choice distributions across treatments (Table 1). Despite 
the symmetric layout of the four boxes in a square, the choice data from the coordi-
nation game in NoGaze reveals a tendency to favor the top boxes. A 휒2-test rejects 
7 In games with perfectly aligned interests, a player can always use a common language to send a cred-
ible message (like pointing with gaze here) to coordinate on a Pareto efficient outcome.
8 See also Ellingsen and Östling (2010) for this distinction between communication protocols that 
induce cheap talk about promises of own actions or requests about other’s actions.
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the null-hypothesis that first movers are choosing randomly ( 휒2=26.5 and p < 0.001 
for first movers and 휒2=6.42 and p < 0.1 for second movers). Choices in the focal 
coordination game are similarly more concentrated on the top boxes, with the focal 
top left box being chosen more often.9 Hence, the lower payoff in the top left box 
indeed has the effect of making this option more salient.
In the discoordination and hide & seek game, in which the first mover receives 
a payoff if the second mover does not choose the same box, this pattern is reversed 
in that the bottom boxes are chosen more frequently. However, these distributions 
are not significantly different from a uniform distribution. The finding that the top 
boxes are chosen less frequently by the first movers is in line with the finding by 
Rubinstein et al. (1997) that hiders choose the apparently salient option less often 
than seekers.
A comparison of choices across treatments already suggests that gaze transfer 
helps to coordinate: When they can see recorded gaze, the second movers’ choice 
Table 1  Average box choices in treatments with free choice
The table shows the choice distributions of the eye-tracked participants and those of the second mov-
ers in parentheses. There were 36 first and second movers in the NoGaze and the LiveGaze-FreeChoice 
treatments, 30 second movers in the RecordedGaze treatment. Data of first movers in the RecordedGaze 
treatment stems from the 30 randomly selected first movers from the NoGaze treatment. Each participant 
played each game five times. Totals unequal 100% are due to rounding
Coordination Focal Coordination Focal Discoordination Hide & Seek
NoGaze
Top left 24% (31%) 35% (59%) 18% (27%) 22% (24%)
Top right 47% (32%) 38% (18%) 23% (17%) 17% (29%)
Bottom left 9% (21%) 9% (11%) 32% (28%) 32% (21%)
Bottom right 19% (17%) 17% (12%) 27% (28%) 29% (26%)
RecordedGaze
Top left 27% (27%) 35% (25%) 18% (17%) 23% (27%)
Top right 44% (41%) 38% (42%) 23% (27%) 18% (19%)
Bottom left 11% (13%) 9% (11%) 34% (27%) 31% (30%)
Bottom right 19% (20%) 18% (21%) 25% (29%) 29% (25%)
LiveGaze-FreeChoice
Top left 34% (36%) 1% (1%) 12% (10%) 26% (29%)
Top right 37% (36%) 46% (46%) 34% (23%) 16% (27%)
Bottom left 13% (12%) 17% (18%) 29% (35%) 34% (24%)
Bottom right 17% (16%) 36% (36%) 24% (32%) 23% (20%)
9 Such a focal coordination game was described by Schelling (1960) and later used in an experiment 
by Bardsley et al. (2010) to study how focal points can foster coordination. Our data fits in with their 
conclusion that both “level-k reasoning” and “team reasoning” seem to occur in this game. Nine subjects 
switch to a predominant choice of the top left box in the focal coordination game, which is only consist-
ent with team reasoning, but there are also six subjects who never choose the top left box in the focal 
coordination game.
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distribution is similar to that of the first movers in both coordination games. This 
is even more pronounced for live gaze transmission. Moreover, in LiveGaze-Fre-
eChoice, the inefficient outcome in the focal coordination game is avoided almost 
completely by the players. In the focal discoordination game, the inefficient option is 
still chosen in LiveGaze-FreeChoice, but less often.
3.2  Non‑strategic gaze
We now investigate how well subjects understand non-strategic gaze (Recorded-
Gaze). Figure 3 depicts the average success rates of the second movers across all 
four treatments and games. Participants in RecordedGaze indeed considerably gain 
from seeing the first movers’ gaze previously recorded in NoGaze. Second movers 
in RecordedGaze achieve significantly higher success rates in all four games than 
in NoGaze (Wilcoxon rank-sum tests comparing individual average success rates in 
each game by treatment, all Bonferroni corrected p values < 0.03). In the three com-
mon interest games, second movers do remarkably well in interpreting the recorded 
gaze patterns. Although the success rate in the hide & seek game is also signifi-
cantly higher when non-strategic gaze can be observed, the gained advantage is less 
pronounced.
Fig. 3  Average success rates of second movers across treatments and games. Notes: A trial is counted as 
a success for the second mover when she receives a positive payoff, i.e. when the two players choose the 
same box in the coordination, the focal coordination, and the hide & seek game and when they choose 
different boxes in the focal discoordination game
 J. Hausfeld et al.
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The second mover in the hide & seek game has to guess the choice of the first 
mover, which is exactly the same task, with the same decision screen, as in the coor-
dination game. Hence, the first mover’s gaze must be more difficult to interpret in 
this game. As mentioned in the Hypotheses Section, we use two simple heuristics 
in order to interpret gaze: The Most Looked heuristic predicts that the first mover 
chooses the box that he looks at for the longest time and the Last Looked heuristic 
states that he chooses the box that he looks at last. We compare the predictive suc-
cess of these two rules in order to show how the gaze data reveals less about choices 
in the hide & seek game.
Table 2 shows the average success rates the second movers in the RecordedGaze 
treatment would achieve if they all followed the respective heuristics. The heuris-
tics also perform worse in the hide & seek game than in the other games (pairwise 
Wilcoxon rank-sum Bonferroni corrected p values < 0.002 except for the predictive 
success of the Last Looked heuristic in the hide & seek vs. the focal discoordination 
game with corrected p = 0.072). Hence, gaze indeed seems to be less informative 
about the actual choice in the hide & seek game, which can explain why the second 
movers in the RecordedGaze treatment profit least from seeing the gaze in the hide 
& seek game. In the common interest games, the two heuristics correctly predict the 
chosen box most of the time. In all games, the heuristics, especially the Last Looked 
heuristic, perform a bit better than the participants did.
The top part of Table  3 shows the shares of participants choosing in line with 
each heuristic. There is also a difference between the hide & seek and the other 
games here: second movers do not choose as often according to the heuristics in the 
hide & seek game.
Summarizing the results of the RecordedGaze treatment, we find strong support 
for our first hypothesis: People are able to correctly interpret gaze that is purely 
instrumental. Contrary to our expectations, the increase in the success rate depends 
on the strategic nature of the game: Choice in the competitive hide & seek game is 
harder to predict from non-strategic gaze than in the common interest games.
3.3  Strategic gaze: success rates
We now turn to the analysis of strategic gaze. When comparing RecordedGaze 
and the two LiveGaze treatments in Fig. 3, we can see that subjects increase their 
Table 2  Shares of correct predictions by the two heuristics in the recorded gaze treatment
Note that for all games except the focal discoordination game, the share of correct predictions corre-
sponds to the second movers’ success rate which they would have achieved if they had all followed the 
predictions of the respective heuristic. For the discoordination game, even when making the wrong pre-
diction about choice, there is still a 2:1 chance to discoordinate
Coordination Focal Coordination Focal Discoordination Hide & Seek
Most Looked 0.82 0.89 0.82 0.61
Last Looked 0.94 0.92 0.88 0.73
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success rate even further when the first movers’ gaze is live transmitted to their 
current partner in the two coordination games. In the coordination game, the suc-
cess rates significantly increase from 83% in RecordedGaze to 91% and 93% in 
LiveGaze-ForcedChoice and LiveGaze-FreeChoice (pairwise Wilcoxon rank-sum 
tests comparing individual average success rates by treatment, both corrected p 
values < 0.04). In the focal coordination game, the effect is even more extreme: 
The success rate of 77% in RecordedGaze increases to 94% in LiveGaze-Forced-
Choice and even to 99% in LiveGaze-FreeChoice (both corrected p values < 0.04).
However, in the focal discoordination game, the success rates are slightly lower 
in LiveGaze than in RecordedGaze, but these differences are non-significant (both 
uncorrected p values > 0.4). Despite the slight decrease in the focal discoordina-
tion game, live gaze transmission nevertheless leads to significantly higher success 
rates compared to NoGaze (both corrected p values < 0.001). Thus, by using their 
gaze as a signaling device, first movers are clearly able to make themselves more 
predictable than without gaze transmission in all three common interest games.
This pattern changes in the hide & seek game: The success rates in the two 
LiveGaze treatments (25% and 29%) are both significantly lower than in Record-
edGaze (51%, both corrected p values < 0.01). Hence, first movers are on average 
able to hide their intentions when it is in their interest to become less predictable. 
However, they are not able to increase their success rate compared to NoGaze by 
somehow misleading seekers with their gaze. In fact, the success rate in Live-
Gaze-FreeChoice is the same as in NoGaze and the success rate in LiveGaze-
ForcedChoice is the one that would result in a hypothetical NoGaze treatment 
with random choices. These are the predicted rates if gaze was completely unin-
formative. The difference between these two success rates is non-significant (both 
uncorrected p values > 0.3).
Table 3  Share of second mover choices in line with heuristics by treatment
A second mover’s choice is counted as in line with the heuristic, if it is a best response to the heuristic’s 
predicted choice of the first mover. Note that, since the heuristics always make point predictions for the 
first mover, there are always three best responses in the focal discoordination game whereas there is only 
one in all other games
Coordination Focal Coordination Focal Discoordination Hide & Seek
RecordedGaze
Most Looked 0.82 0.77 0.93 0.68
Last Looked 0.86 0.81 0.94 0.68
LiveGaze-ForcedChoice
Most Looked 0.94 0.96 0.93 0.46
Last Looked 0.94 0.94 0.92 0.44
LiveGaze-FreeChoice
Most Looked 0.96 0.99 0.93 0.31
Last Looked 0.94 0.99 0.92 0.30
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3.4  Strategic gaze: characteristics
To get an impression of how first movers make use of the opportunity to gaze strategi-
cally, we compare the average number of fixations and the average fixation durations 
across games (see Table 4). The gaze characteristics do not differ much in the NoGaze 
treatment or between the three common interest games in the LiveGaze treatments. In 
contrast, the average number of fixations is significantly higher in the hide & seek game 
compared to the three common interest games in both LiveGaze treatments (pairwise 
Wilcoxon signed ranks tests, all corrected p values < 0.02). Similarly, the average fixation 
duration is significantly shorter in the hide & seek game than in the other three games for 
both LiveGaze treatments (all corrected p values < 0.01). Thus, subjects move their gaze 
more quickly from one box to another and do so more often in the hide & seek game 
than in the common interest games, which makes the gaze more difficult to interpret.
These effects also become apparent in the predictive success of the two heuristics 
we introduced earlier (Most Looked and Last Looked, see Table 5). In both LiveGaze 
treatments, the success rates of both heuristics in the hide & seek game drop to val-
ues of 31% and below. This suggests that at least some first movers actively try to 
keep their gaze from the chosen option. In contrast, in the coordination as well as 
the focal coordination game, the heuristics’ hit rates lie between 96 and 100%, indi-
cating that the first movers succeed in sending a clear signal. Finally, first movers 
seem to have more difficulties in sending clear signals in the focal discoordination 
game as the heuristics’ success rates only lie between 74 and 82%.10
Table 4  Average fixation numbers and fixation durations across games and treatments
The top half of the table shows the average number of fixations between boxes per game for each treat-
ment. The bottom half shows the according average fixation durations in seconds. We consider every-
thing a fixation that is displayed to the participants as a red box, i.e. a fixation starts when the respective 
box turns red and ends when it turns gray again
Coordination Focal Coordination Focal Discoordination Hide & Seek
Average number of fixations
NoGaze 5.3 5.3 4.6 5.3
LiveGaze-ForcedChoice 2.8 2.6 5.3 9.3
LiveGaze-FreeChoice 4.7 3.4 4.8 13.8
Average fixation duration in 
seconds
NoGaze 1.05 0.83 1.00 0.66
LiveGaze-ForcedChoice 2.57 2.67 1.84 0.67
LiveGaze-FreeChoice 1.85 2.43 1.95 0.73
10 The success rates of all heuristics are significantly smaller in the hide & seek game than in all other 
games (Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, all corrected p values < 0.002). Further, success rates in the focal dis-
coordination game are significantly smaller than in the (focal) coordination games (all corrected p val-
ues < 0.002), and they do not significantly differ between the focal and the non-focal coordination game 
(all corrected p values > 0.1).
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The heuristics’ hit rates in the focal coordination game in LiveGaze-FreeChoice are 
exceptionally high (100% for the both Last Looked and Most Looked heuristic). This 
indicates that the presence of the salient but inefficient outcome in the focal coordina-
tion game makes subjects exhibit the most telling gaze. They clearly avoid looking at 
the focal option: Compared to the coordination game, the share of first fixations on 
the top left box drops from more than 50% to less than 15% in the focal coordination 
game. Similarly, the share of trials in which the top left box is not even looked at once 
increases from 36 to 71%. Hence, it is not the case that the presence of a focal option 
makes it more difficult to communicate choice of another box with gaze.
In the focal discoordination game, the heuristics’ hit rates are significantly 
lower than in the other common interest games. This indicates that the ability to 
send clear signals also depends on the nature of the strategic situation at hand. 
A discoordination game adds complexity to the situation as the signal becomes 
ambiguous: It could both be an announcement of the first mover’s own strategy 
but also a choice recommendation for the second mover. This aspect could make 
it harder for the first movers to commit to a particular gazing strategy such that 
their gaze becomes more difficult to interpret. Further, the share of second mov-
ers deciding in line with a belief based on the respective heuristics never drops 
below 90% also in the focal discoordination game (see Table 3). This indicates 
that the failure to increase the success rate in the discoordination game with stra-
tegic compared to non-strategic gaze is due to first movers not choosing the box 
that they emphasized with their eye gaze.
In order to explore the effects of the strategic environment on the signal quality 
more closely, we also analyze the distribution of viewing time across the four boxes. 
Figure 4 shows the cumulative distribution of the share of viewing time which sub-
jects allocate to all but the most inspected box (separately for all four games and 
the two LiveGaze treatments). The intercept with the y-axis indicates the share of 
games in which the respective first mover only looked at a single box. This share is 
largest in the focal coordination game in both LiveGaze treatments (86% and 67%, 
Table 5  Shares of correct predictions by the two heuristics in live gaze treatments
The table shows each heuristic’s share of correct predictions in each game for the LiveGaze-Forced-
Choice (top) and the LiveGaze-FreeChoice treatment (bottom)
Coordination Focal Coordination Focal Discoordination Hide & Seek
LiveGaze-ForcedChoice
Most Looked 0.97 0.96 0.74 0.22
Last Looked 0.97 0.99 0.79 0.31
LiveGaze-FreeChoice
Most Looked 0.96 1.00 0.79 0.26
Last Looked 0.97 1.00 0.82 0.30
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respectively). In LiveGaze-FreeChoice, the cumulative distribution of gaze time in 
the focal coordination game is always to the left of that in the coordination game, 
i.e. gaze in the focal coordination game is particularly clear also with respect to 
the allocation of viewing time (two-sided Kolmogorov–Smirnov test, corrected p 
value < 0.001).
This is different for the focal discoordination game. In both treatments, the share 
of first movers looking at only one box is lower in the focal discoordination game 
than in the focal coordination game. The cumulative distributions of gaze time in the 
focal discoordination game are also always to the right of their counterparts from the 
focal coordination game and these differences are significant (Kolmogorov–Smirnov 
tests, both corrected p values < 0.001). Signal strength in terms of viewing time thus 
clearly suffers in the focal discoordination game. In the hide & seek game, the share 
of viewing time of all but the most looked-at choice start out relatively low and flat 
and becomes steeper toward the dashed lines. This indicates that at least some first 
movers looked at each of the boxes for approximately the same amount of time, 
which blurs their intended choice.
Fig. 4  Cumulative distribution of share of viewing time on all boxes other than the most inspected box 
across games and livegaze-treatments. Notes: The graphs show the distribution of the share of viewing 
time that subjects allocate to all boxes except the one they inspect the most. The intercept with the y-axis 
thus corresponds to the percentage of people that only look at one single box in the respective game and 
treatment. The dashed lines mark the natural maximum of 75% viewing time on the non-most inspected 
boxes, which is reached if all four boxes are inspected for exactly 25% of the time
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3.5  Strategic gaze in hide & seek: signal‑jamming and misleading
We now look at the success rates of different gaze-choice combinations across all 
trials in the hide & seek game. Among the gaze strategies in which all four boxes 
are looked at, the mean number of fixations is in fact very high in both LiveGaze 
treatments (13.8 in ForcedChoice and 18.4 in FreeChoice), indicating that these first 
movers are indeed trying to make themselves unpredictable. The modal gaze in both 
LiveGaze treatments is characterized by this method (56.7% in ForcedChoice and 
66.1% in FreeChoice, see Table 6).11
A second straightforward method to hide one’s intended choice in our setting 
would be to simply not look at any boxes at all, e.g. by closing your eyes and blindly 
pressing a button. We did not mention this possibility in the instructions but we nei-
ther explicitly forbade it. Nevertheless, only 6.1% of trials feature this method in 
LiveGaze-ForcedChoice and only 8.9% in LiveGaze-FreeChoice.
Apart from trying to hide their intentions, first movers could also try to actively 
mislead second movers into holding a wrong belief. To achieve this, some partici-
pants try to emphasize one or more boxes with their gaze and then choose either the 
emphasized or a different box. In the post-experimental questionnaire, participants 
using such techniques for instance describe them like this: “[I] never looked at the 
chosen box”; “[I looked] at the chosen box because I assumed that the respective 
other partner would not expect this”; “I concentrated on a different box and switched 
to another box shortly before my choice but also did not choose that one”; “I always 
looked at a different box first and then briefly at the one I chose and then at the first 
one again”. In LiveGaze-ForcedChoice, 20% of choices are made by only looking 
at a single box and 17.2% looking at two or three boxes. Similarly, in LiveGaze-
FreeChoice, 13.9% of choices feature gaze at only one box and 11.1% feature gaze 
at two or three boxes. Table 6 summarizes which strategies are applied in the two 
LiveGaze treatments and shows their respective success rates in parentheses.
Recall that, on average, first movers in both LiveGaze treatments are able to reach 
success rates statistically indistinguishable from those in NoGaze (70.5%). However, 
in LiveGaze-ForcedChoice, much higher success rates are reached if neither the box 
they inspect most nor last is chosen. Looking at only one box, but then choosing 
a different one, even reached an average success rate of 90%. As can be seen in 
Table 7, this effect is also significant. It shows the marginal effects of several probit 
models of first movers’ success in the hide & seek game regressed on the different 
strategies. The baseline choice strategy that is left out in the models is choosing the 
most emphasized box (i.e. the box that is looked at last when this was also the box 
that is looked at most).
The top half of the table shows the results for LiveGaze-ForcedChoice. In the 
first column, we see that the probability of a first mover success increases by more 
than 30% if he chooses neither the last nor the most inspected box. Looking at the 
same model estimated for different sub-samples, we see that this effect is especially 
11 There are also a few first movers who in every round do not look at all four boxes: 7 in ForcedChoice 
and 4 in FreeChoice.
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pronounced for those subjects that only look at a single box but then choose a dif-
ferent one. These subjects even significantly increase their success probability by 
58.8% compared to those that choose the only box they look at (column “Looked 
at One”). The effect of choosing neither the most nor the last inspected box is also 
significantly positive for those subjects who look at all four boxes at least once 
(+ 28.3%, column “Looked at All”). For the same group of subjects, also choosing 
the box they look at last significantly increases their success probability by 11.7% 
when this box did not coincide with their most inspected box.12
In LiveGaze-FreeChoice, however, none of the strategies significantly affect the 
first movers’ success probabilities, neither in the whole sample nor in any of the 
Table 7  First mover success regressed on gaze strategy (probit models, marginal effects)
Baseline category is “Most = Last”, i.e. choosing the box that was looked at most when it coincides with 
the box that was looked at last. Explanatory variables are dummies corresponding to the other choice 
strategies. The same model is estimated on different sub-samples. The whole sample was used in the 
models in the first column. In the second column, only those trials were included in which all four boxes 
were inspected at least once. In the third column, only those in which exactly one box was looked at and 
in the last column all trials in which two or three boxes were inspected. Robust standard errors clustered 
at the subject level. Standard errors for marginal effects in parentheses obtained via the Delta-Method. 
All omitted cells are due to too few observations in cell
***Significant at the 0.1% level. **Significant at the 1% level. *Significant at the 5% level. †Significant 
at the 10% level
Probit dependent variable: first mover success (binary)
(Sub-)sample Full Looked at all Looked at one Other
LiveGaze-ForcedChoice
Most, not Last .010 (omitted) – (omitted)
(.087)
Last, not Most .140† .117† – − .174
(.083) (.069) (.435)
Neither .337** .283* .588*** .145
(.121) (.128) (.154) (.201)
N 180 102 36 31
LiveGaze-FreeChoice
Most, not Last − .104 − .055 – (omitted)
(.176) (.197)
Last, not Most − .018 − .015 – (omitted)
(.153) (.173)
Neither .038 .091 .019 − .111
(.083) (.124) (.168) (.314)
N 180 119 25 18
12 More than 50% of second movers chose the box that the first mover either looked at most or last (or 
both) in the hide & seek game in LiveGaze-ForcedChoice even when the first movers tried to blur their 
intention and looked at all four boxes (see Table 6).
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sub-samples. At least the tendencies are the same: Both when only one or when 
all boxes are looked at, success rates are highest when neither the most nor the last 
inspected box is chosen. It thus seems that although some people try to mislead 
their counterpart, only few succeed and only in specific circumstances. The focus on 
gazing in LiveGaze-ForcedChoice without having to worry about the actual choice 
(which is practically made by the computer) seems to help at least some subjects in 
choosing a good gaze strategy.
3.6  Heterogeneity
3.6.1  Classification of types
While our initial hypotheses were focused on the aggregate success rates, the previ-
ous section has shown that there is considerable heterogeneity in the strategies that 
subjects employ in the hide & seek game. In this section, we give some structure to 
this analysis of individual behavior, asking how subjects with different levels of stra-
tegic sophistication behave in the different games. We rely on the “level-k” model 
of strategic thinking (Nagel 1995; Stahl and Wilson 1995; Ho et  al. 1998; Costa‐
Gomes et al. 2001; Camerer et al. 2004; Costa-Gomes and Crawford 2006; Cai and 
Wang 2006; Crawford and Iriberri 2007). This kind of behavior type analysis is typi-
cally used to predict initial responses of subjects who play a game in normal form. 
If eye-tracking is used, then in order to gain additional information about strategic 
reasoning.13
In contrast, our design is focused on the strategic use of gaze. The strategy space 
of a sender in the associated normal form consists of all possible gaze variations in 
addition to choices. Hence, if we want to identify behavior types, we need to restrict 
attention to the most important gaze characteristics. We will assume here that first 
movers only choose gaze (as in the LiveGaze-ForcedChoice treatment), and we char-
acterize a gazing strategy by the box that is emphasized with gaze. There are poten-
tially many ways in which a box could be emphasized, but we focus on looking at 
one box most or last, which were good predictors of choices in our non-strategic 
gaze data.
There are various assumptions about the anchoring L0 types in the literature, 
which all have in common that L0 is a non-strategic type. Particularly relevant for 
our setting are Crawford (2003), Cai and Wang (2006), and Ellingsen and Östling 
(2010), who argue that in games with communication, L0 behavior should be the 
naive strategy of sending only truthful signals. Accordingly, we assume that an L0 
type exhibits gaze as if gaze was not transmitted. Our assumption about L0 receiv-
ers is that they are insensitive to payoffs and ignore any meaning that gaze might 
have, but that they favor salient options as in Crawford and Iriberri (2007). While 
saliency of locations as in their setting may also play a role in our design (e.g. of 
13 For example, Polonio et al. (2015) have used their eye-tracking data to classify players as cognitive 
hierarchy types and predict some choices. Devetag et al. (2016) find unsophisticated choices but sophisti-
cated search patterns. They arrive at a type classification that however only carries over to similar games.
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the top boxes), here we focus solely on gaze. A box is salient if the opponent’s gaze 
emphasizes this box.
Type L1 then best responds to L0. As a second mover, an L1 type tries to infer 
choices from non-strategic gaze, i.e. forms beliefs about the opponent’s choice 
according to the most-looked or last-looked heuristic. In the two coordination games 
and hide & seek, an L1 receiver chooses an emphasized box. In the discoordination 
game, an L1 receiver chooses a non-emphasized box. A L1 first mover who best 
responds to a L0 second mover emphasizes and chooses the same box in the coordi-
nation game and different ones in hide & seek and discoordination. An L2 type will 
then best respond to L1 behavior, and so on. Table 8 summarizes the behavior cor-
responding to the different levels of sophistication.
It becomes clear that the coordination games are strategically simple: All types 
above L0 manage to coordinate with gaze. Note also that with free choice of a box, 
TL is never chosen in the focal coordination game by any type above L0. The pres-
ence of L0 types or noise would mean a slightly smaller success rate, with possible 
choices of TL. One can also see that hide & seek is a more complex game in which 
strategic sophistication matters a lot. The cyclical nature of the best responses in this 
game is reflected in the way the cognitive types cycle through all kinds of behavior. 
First movers of type L1 and L2 both try to mislead by emphasizing one box and 
choosing another. L3 types are typically rare and cannot be distinguished from an 
L0 type. However, one of the subjects in our experiment actually revealed this kind 
of thinking by stating that “[I looked] at the chosen box because I assumed that the 
respective other partner would not expect this”.
The discoordination game is of intermediate complexity: Emphasizing a box 
with gaze is interpreted as “I have chosen this box” for some types or as “You 
should choose this box” for others. Again, the top left box is not chosen by sender 
or receiver above type L0 in this game. When playing the focal discoordination 
game with gaze, the types on average do not do very well since they do not take 
into account that they may misunderstand the sender’s signal. A sophisticated type 
who plays a best response to a population of players with different levels of strategic 
sophistications may therefore be best off by choosing the top left box.
Furthermore, the classification should also include an equilibrium type. As 
described in our initial hypotheses, we expect equilibrium types to try to signal what 
they choose in the common interest games and exhibit completely uninformative 
gaze in the hide & seek game. Unfortunately, uninformative gaze can—in equilib-
rium—be any gaze pattern. Not looking at all is clearly an uninformative gazing 
strategy, and distributing gaze evenly among all four boxes can also be interpreted 
as such.
Since the predictions for the behavior of the different types depend on the speci-
fied L0 types and because there are different ways to emphasize a box, one should 
not overestimate the predictive power of our interpretation of the behavior types. In 
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the following, we explore whether we can categorize first movers in the hide & seek 
game given their gaze and choice data (see Figs. 5, 6 in the Appendix for a graphical 
representation of the data).
We do a two-fold classification based on behavior in the hide & seek game: 1) 
does any box have a larger share than 40% of gaze and 2) is the chosen box empha-
sized by either being looked at most or last. If 1) is true, then the strategy is counted 
as “looked mainly at one box”, else as “distributed gaze”. As each first mover 
made five choices, he qualifies to be a certain type if he plays the same strategy at 
least three times, which classifies 54 of the 72 subjects in the Live-treatments (see 
Table 9).14 The remaining subjects do not have one predominant strategy across the 
five rounds.
First, we see that there are very few people in NoGaze that distribute their gaze. 
This strategy, which is associated with an equilibrium type of the interactive treat-
ments, is indeed used more often in the LiveGaze-treatments. Moreover, in the 
LiveGaze-treatments more subjects are in the category “choose the non-emphasized 
option” and thus try to actively mislead the second mover (corresponding to types 
L1 and L2 in Table 8).
We can further compare the types in the LiveGaze-treatments by consider-
ing whether they behave in a weird (L0 or random) manner in the coordina-
tion games: Either by spending less than 50% on the chosen box or by choosing 
a 10-point box in LiveGaze-FreeChoice, or by not choosing the required option in 
Table 9  Classification of first movers based on hide & seek behavior
The table shows a classification of types based upon the gaze style (most looked at box received more 
than 40% of gaze) and features of the chosen option (emphasized or not). The remaining subjects are 
classified as mixing between rounds. The bracketed number shows how many subjects within a category 
behaved “weirdly” in the coordination and focal coordination games. The table also has the percentage of 
trials in which the categories chose an emphasized option in the focal discoordination game indicated by 
the percentage after the D
Types if 3 times same pattern
Gaze style Distributed gaze Looked mainly at one box Mixing between
Chosen option Emphasized Not emphasized Emphasized Not emphasized
NoGaze 1 (–) 1 (–) 26 (–) 5 (–) 3 (–)
LiveGaze-
ForcedChoice
1 (0); D (100%) 6 (0); D (66.7%) 6 (3); D (100%) 14 (0); D (84.3%) 9 (2); D (62.2%)
LiveGaze-
FreeChoice
1 (1); D (100%) 11 (3); D (61.8%) 5 (2); D (80%) 10 (1); D (80%) 9 (1); D (86.7%)
14 Requiring the same kind of strategy at least 80% of trials instead of 60% leads to having only 35 out 
of 72 subjects being assigned a strategic type.
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LiveGaze-ForcedChoice. As can be seen from the bracketed numbers in Table  9, 
subjects who mainly look at one box and choose an emphasized box in the hide & 
seek game are more likely than the other categories to behave in a weird manner in 
the other coordination games.
Further, the level-k classification of Table 8 suggests different levels for empha-
sizing or non-emphasizing gaze of first movers in the discoordination game. Table 9 
shows this information after the”D”: The number indicates the percentage of trials 
in which an emphasized option is chosen in the focal discoordination game within 
the categories. We see that subjects that choose a non-emphasized option in the hide 
& seek game sometimes also choose the non-emphasized option (indicating an L1 
type) and sometimes the emphasized option (indicating an L2 type) in the focal 
discoordination game. Subjects choosing an emphasized option in the hide & seek 
game are also likely to choose the emphasized option in the focal discoordination 
game (indicating a non-strategic type).
4  Discussion
Our results show that people are generally able to correctly interpret non-strategic 
gaze in common interest games and, to a lesser extent, in a competitive hide & seek 
game. The differences in the degree to which non-strategic gaze is understood can 
be explained by differences in the non-strategic gaze patterns: Subjects are more 
predictable when they choose the option that they look at last or for the longest time. 
Subjects strategically adapt their gaze when they are live transmitted to their current 
opponent, making their gaze particularly easy to interpret when their interests are 
perfectly aligned and making it more difficult to read when their interests are per-
fectly opposed.
We use simple games to explore the effects of gaze transfer, but the results also 
shed light on what can be expected in more complex situations. The strategic use of 
gaze is of importance in all situations in which people meet face-to-face and try to 
anticipate each other’s actions, e.g. bargaining, interrogations, coordination, games 
or sports. The hide & seek game, for instance, captures the strategic situation of 
penalty kicks in soccer. Indeed, Tay et al. (2010) find that goal keepers are worse at 
predicting the direction of a shot when the kicker is instructed to try to deceive the 
goalie, e.g. by looking in the opposite direction before taking the shot (Dicks et al. 
2010; Nagano et al. 2006). Also, for other games, sports psychology has investigated 
how an athlete’s action can be predicted from cues observable shortly before the 
action, often including the direction of gaze. Some studies also show that such cues 
can be mimicked in order to deceive the opponent [tennis (Rowe et al. 2009), rugby 
1 3
Strategic gaze: an interactive eye-tracking study 
(Jackson et  al. 2006), basketball (Sebanz and Shiffrar 2009), or handball (Cañal-
Bruland and Schmidt 2009)].
The general question how being observed changes behavior and how others will 
infer motives from subtle cues like the direction of gaze is likely to gain importance 
in the digital age, with implicit messages being read into response times and search 
patterns. With this broad interpretation, other considerations come into play, for 
example the role of experience and learning. We decided to not give any feedback 
and randomly re-match between rounds, but the question how learning via feedback 
affects strategic gaze is a natural continuation of this study. More research is needed 
to investigate whether strategically deceptive signals, be it with the eyes or via other 
cues, can systematically fool others. In particular, one would like to know whether 
people are overconfident regarding their ability to read cues or whether they learn to 
disregard cues that can easily be manipulated.
It would also be interesting to compare different kinds of signals. There is for 
example a recent literature that sheds light on the ability of people to predict what 
players will do from their facial expressions (Kovács‐Bálint et al. 2013; van Leeu-
wen et  al. 2018) or response times (Frydman and Krajbich 2017; Konovalov and 
Krajbich 2019). For cooperative situations, the question is whether it is easier to 
convey information using gaze, movement, facial expressions, language, or a com-
bination. For competitive situations, it would be interesting to know whether some 
signals are more resistant to being mimicked than others.
Another open question is whether gaze can also signal things other than inten-
tions such as sophistication, commitment, trustworthiness, attitude, or cooperative-
ness: Can people discern whether the gaze they see stems from an expert or novice? 
Are they able to predict how trustworthy or cooperative a person will act judging 
from her gaze? It would then again be interesting to see whether live gaze transmis-
sion is strategically utilized by the eye-tracked subjects also in these settings, for 
example to signal their own or a different type to evoke a specific response.
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Appendix
Individual gaze and choice behavior
The following two figures show a combination of both gaze and choice for all first 
movers in the Live-treatments for all five rounds of the hide & seek game (Fig. 5 
for LiveGaze-ForcedChoice and Fig. 6 for LiveGaze-FreeChoice). The x-axis distin-
guishes between the five rounds in the hide & seek game, the y-axis shows the time 
share of the total time spent looking at the boxes for each box. The time share spent 
looking at a box is visualized using different colors for the respective boxes. After 
these four columns, there is always a black dot and a red cross. The black dot repre-
sents the time share spent on the chosen box, while the red cross represents the time 
share spent on the last looked at box, e.g. subject 301 looked at the TR box most 
and also last, but chose the BR box. Two subjects never looked at any box in all four 
rounds, e.g. subjects 336 or 410, but do have data for the coordination games. 
Fig. 5  Individual data of all subjects in the LiveGaze-ForcedChoice treatment. The x-axis shows the 5 
periods within the hide & seek game, while the y-axis shows the time share of total time for each box
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